5ème conférence internationale de l’ESS

La cinquième conférence de l’European Social Survey (ESS) aura lieu à Lisbonne, au Portugal, du 8 au 10 Juillet 2024.

La conférence a pour thème Relever les grands défis sociétaux à l’échelle transnationale : Investigation, innovation et perspectives en utilisant 20 ans de données (Addressing grand societal challenges cross-nationally: Investigation, innovation and insights from 20 years of data).

Elle se tiendra à l’ICS – Université de Lisbonne et à l’ISCTE – Institut universitaire de Lisbonne.

Le programme des sessions est disponible ici.

Agnalys Michaud (CDSP) et Frédéric Gonthier (Progedo, Sciences Po Grenoble, Pacte CNRS) présenteront différents résultats issus des données françaises et internationales

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Generating new insights from the CROss-National Online Survey 2 (CRONOS-2) panel II
Time: 08/July/2024: 1:30pm-3:00pm · Location: ICS and ISCTE

Can information on inequalities in contributions to climate change modify political support?

Agnalys Michaud, Sylvain Brouard

Sciences Po, France

Our way of living has led to an unequivocal increase in the earth’s surface temperature of about 1.07°C (IPCC, 2021). Suppose no substantial changes are made so that human activities generate significantly less carbon equivalent emissions. In that case, we will soon exceed 1.5°C of increase and most likely exceed three °C by the end of this century. The more carbon equivalent we emit into the atmosphere, the greater the climate hazards and the risks to ecosystems and human beings. Consequently, “mid- and long-term risks generated by climate change depend on our near-term capacities to mitigate and adapt to climate change” (IPCC, 2022). Contributions to climate change are pretty unequal; the wealthiest have significantly higher carbon footprint than the poorest (Chancel, 2022). In addition, climate change will be a vector of inequality; the poorest capacity to adapt will be restricted. To face this challenge, policies that promote profound change in our lifestyles and adaptations will be needed.

There is a growing literature demonstrating that knowledge, also named prior beliefs, is a determinant of policy support (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2019; Stantcheva, 2020; Alsan et al., 2020a; Alsan et al., 2020b; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022). Through experiments, these authors showed that providing information can, to some extent, change beliefs, attitudes, and so-called preferences. Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022 demonstrate that support for more climate action increases when the impacts of three different measures (ban on combustion energy, carbon tax, and green infrastructure programs) are explained. They conclude that support for climate change policy depends on a combination of the perceived effectiveness of the measure, the perceived impact on inequality (on the lowest income), and self-interest.

In this article, we test the effect of a message that provides information on carbon emissions and the capacity to adapt depending on the wealth, on policies ‘support. To do so, we use the experiment that was run in CRONOS-2 French wave. We analyze the effect of providing information on the contributions of the 10% richest and 10% poorest emissions on the support for policies that promote i) the reduction of wealth and income differences, ii) an increase in the money dedicated to climate change, and iii) lastly a policy that will help the poorest to adapt. We make the hypothesis that making these aspects salient can increase policy support (Bordalo et al., 2022). To test the robustness of such information effect, we also test the effect of question order on policy support, making the hypothesis that priming can generate some increase to policy support through the assimilation effect (Strack, 1992; Tourangeau et al., 2000). We find that the message increases the support to help adapt specifically to climate change for the poorest.

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Generating new insights from the CROss-National Online Survey 2 (CRONOS-2) panel II
Time: 08/July/2024: 1:30pm-3:00pm · Location: ICS and ISCTE

How trust influence vaccination attitude : CRONOS 2 data insigth

Agnalys Michaud

Sciences Po, France

The covid-19 crisis caused unprecedented health and economic disruption. The end of the crisis was made possible thank to the adoption of health measures: barrier measures and, above all, vaccination of a large proportion of the population. Numerous authors demonstrate that the acceptance of protective measures, is influenced by trust (Algan et al., 2021; Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020; Barrios et al., 2021; Brodeur et al., 2021; Durante et al., 2021; Engle et al., 2020, Galasso et al., 2022, Umer, 2023). These authors show that in the United States and Italy the reduction of mobility is more significant when the level of trust in their fellow citizens is high. Umer (2023) shows that in the Netherlands trust in people is a better predictor of compliance with preventive measures, i.e., staying at home, than pro social determinants. This horizontal trust is considered a proxy of social capital and is, therefore, seen as a factor likely to foster cooperation. Algan et al., 2021, who consider many European states and address vaccination acceptance, find more contrasted results. They show that, at the individual level, trust in scientists is a more critical driver of vaccination acceptance than trust in others or trust in governments. Galasso et al., 2022 and Kerr et al., 2020 also found that trust in scientists is a determinant of vaccination intentions. Vertical trust is likely to increase the collective and individual benefits that individuals perceive from vaccination campaigns, allowing them to better understand the benefits that vaccination can have on their health, the health system, and the economy. Another dimension influencing the willingness to be vaccinated is the sensitivity to fake news and conspiracy theories (Roozenbeek et al., 2020). Vaccination is presented as an act of deprivation of liberty that would systematically lead to more significant deprivation. Additionally, mistrust toward COVID-19 vaccination and sensitivity to fake news is more frequently observed when people have extreme political positions, mainly far-right positions. This effect of political ideology is particularly pronounced in the United States of America. Engle et al., 2020, demonstrate that states with a higher proportion of Republican voters were less likely to reduce their mobility. Brodeur et al., 2021 demonstrate that, in contrast, Democrat states are more likely to reduce mobility. Gelfand et al., 2022, found that political ideology strongly determines the willingness to wear a mask and that Republicans were less likely to be sensitive to measures that promote masks. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) which introduced questions on vaccines in 21 countries (mostly European countries), Backhaus et al., 2023, show that far-right voters are more likely to be vaccine averse. More widely, Van Prooijen et al., 2015 demonstrate that individuals with political extremism positions are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs.

In this paper we use CRONOS 2 data to analyze the determinants of attitude towards the respect of protective measures and vaccination with a special focus on trust. By enriching them with their ESS response we analyze the influence of political ideologies and conspiracy indicators.

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Attitudes towards economic redistribution, inequality and fairness II
Time: 09/July/2024: 1:30pm-3:00pm · Location: ICS and ISCTE

What influences judgements about the fairness of income?

Agnalys Michaud

Sciences Po, France

We can advocate that there is an apparent contradiction between the fact that inequality is increasing and the reported level of income difference desired (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014; Pederson & Mutz, 2019). One of the main reasons given for this discrepancy is misinformation and misperception (Gimpelson & Treisman 2017). But experiments delivering information to correct this misperception show that not all people want to know their actual ranking (Fehr et al., 2019), and furthermore, when people are wealthier than they initially thought, this can increase their reluctance to promote redistribution policies (Karadja et al., 2017). Research on inequality shows that other determinants such as culture, beliefs about the extent to which luck or effort are determinants of individuals’ circumstances, and social mobility strongly influence preferences for redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005 ; Alesina, Stantcheva & Teso, 2018). Hvidberg, Kreiner & Stantcheva, 2020 show that people are more sensitive to income inequality when people have the same education or similar working position.

In this work, we use data from the ESS, which has the advantage of providing the income level of the top and bottom 10% of full-time employees in the country where the survey took place and therefore eliminates misperceptions. We analyze the extent to which judgements about different income levels and preferences for fairness are influenced by people’s perceptions of their own and others’ chances of accessing education and finding a job, by their political positions and by their general judgements about people getting what they deserve, their social mobility. We also control for socio-demographic variables. We will also question to what extent their own judgment is influenced by their own occupation, relative to people who have similar social position, more precisely education or work position.

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Measurement error and questionnaire design in mixed mode surveys
Time: 10/July/2024: 9:30am-11:00am · Location: ICS and ISCTE

Self-completion response rate and effects of mode of collection on respondent profile and their responses

Yves Fradier, Clément Collin, Agnalys Michaud

Verian, France

The eleventh wave of ESS in France provided the opportunity to use CAWI as a new data collection method for the first time in the country, in addition of the usual face-to-face survey.

In this push to web mission, 4,000 individuals were randomly selected, for an expected response rate of 25% (1,000 respondents). These individuals were invited to complete the survey online, receiving an unconditional €5 gift voucher. They were then contacted up to 3 times by postal letters. For the second reminder, a paper questionnaire was included in the letter, so that respondents could complete the survey by paper if they preferred. An additional €10 gift voucher was promised to all respondents. Out of 1000 respondents, 200 paper questionnaires were expected.

Even though the collection phase is not yet complete (collection ends in March 2024), the CAWI and PAPI response rates has proved to be highly satisfactory, even exceeding initial projections (+25% response rate).

An additional source of satisfaction is that the novelty of this mode of collection enabled us to set up a methodological experiment which is already proving highly instructive.

2 distinct protocols were set up:

• In the first protocol (A), individuals were only contacted by postal letter (invitation and reminder letters).

• For the second sample (B), these letters were supplemented by e-mails and SMS messages.

The results of this experiment are already very encouraging, with a +6 points difference of response rate in favor of the second contact protocol. Differences in term of response rate are also observed between the different wave of reminders.

The aim of this presentation will be to review the methodological experiments carried out during this auto-completion survey. Particular attention will be paid to the effect of additional e-mail and telephone contacts on the response rate. This analysis will be complemented by a detailed analysis of the effects of collection methods (CAWI / PAPI vs CAPI) on respondent profiles and on the content of responses obtained (desirability bias in particular).

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How Europeans view and evaluate democracy, a decade later III
Time: 10/July/2024: 9:30am-11:00am · Location: ICS and ISCTE

When political competition revolves around models of democracy. Democratic views, vote choice and party system polarization

Frederic Gonthier

Sciences Po Grenoble, University of Grenoble Alpes, France

With its two dedicated modules, the ESS provides significant insights into layman’s views of democracy. Notably, research indicates strong support for liberal, social, and direct models, suggesting a shared understanding of democracy. Yet Europeans amalgamate democratic features that may be considered distinct or incompatible. The mismatch is not only evident from the theoretical standpoint of competing models of democracy but also given that political parties address the antecedents and consequences of liberal, social, or direct democracy in different ways.

The question of whether ordinary citizens incorporate party stances into their democratic beliefs is crucial in the current context of escalating polarization. Whereas the conventional account posits that heightened party competition improves satisfaction with democracy and turnout, much less is known about the nexus between democratic views, electoral behavior, and party system polarization. This paper contends that democratic views mediate the relationship between party polarization and voting. It is argued that party polarization on cultural, economic, and democratic issues has a differential influence on vote choice depending on the democratic model citizens support.

Two sets of hypotheses are scrutinized. First, consistent with studies stressing that populist voters are disgruntled with liberal democracy and responsive to issues such as social protection or the renewal of democratic institutions (protest thesis), it is anticipated that citizens supporting the liberal model are more inclined to vote for non-populist parties (H1a), while their counterparts supporting the social model are more likely to vote for radical-left populist parties (H2a). Similarly, those supportive of the populist model are more prone to vote for radical-right populist parties (H3a).

Second, drawing on the notion that party polarization enhances citizens’ propensity to follow elite cues (responsiveness thesis), the three trends above are expected to be more pronounced when there is a high level of party polarization on cultural issues (associated with cleavages inherent in liberal democracy) (H1b), economic issues (linked to social democracy) (H2b), and democratic issues (related to popular sovereignty) (H3b).

Data from ESS 10 are first combined with expert data from the PopuList to assess how democratic views shape electoral behavior. Multilevel CFA and logistic models provide evidence that democratic views exert a specific effect, with Europeans holding strong liberal views more likely to vote for non-populist parties. Conversely, those holding strong social or populist views more likely cast a ballot for a populist party and abstain from voting (in line with the apathy thesis).

CHES data are then used to measure party polarization on cultural, economic and democratic issues at the country level. The second set of hypotheses receives mixed empirical support. While the probability of voting for populist parties increases more with party polarization on democratic issues amoung citizens holding populist views, cross-level interactions between party polarization and democratic views are less significant when examining the impact of liberal and social issues on electoral behavior.

All in all, democratic views are a route to voting but they play to the hilt when political competition touches upon popular sovereignty and involves the populist model of democracy.

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